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Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish 
Dispositions* 
 
Andrea Guardo 
 
According to Saul Kripke, my meaning addition by “+” (and, more gener-
ally, my meaning a certain thing by a certain sign) cannot be analysed in 
terms of my having certain dispositions for two reasons. The first being that 
the relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative1. The 
second being, on the one hand, that the totality of my dispositions covers 
only a finite segment of the total function2 and, on the other hand, that some 
of us have dispositions to make mistakes3. Here I will not say anything of 
interest about the “Argument from Normativity” (which I have already dis-
cussed elsewhere4); I will rather focus on the “Argument from Finitude and 
Mistake”. The most popular objection to this latter argument is that it takes 
into account only the most naïve of the dispositional analyses and that it 
does not work against a less rough approach. Here I will discuss what we 
may call the “Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis”, the sole “less rough 
                                               
* Earlier versions of (some parts of) this paper were given at the VIII National Conference 
of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy and at the Università degli Studi di Milano 
in February 2009. A distant ancestor of the argument of this paper appeared in my Il Mito 
del Dato, Milano-Udine, Mimesis, 2009, II, § 3, pp. 80-82. The book is a slightly revised 
version of my PhD thesis, which I defended in January 2008. 
1 Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language – An Elementary Exposi-
tion (1981), Oxford, Blackwell, 1982, 2, pp. 23-25 and 37. 
2 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cit., 2, pp. 26-27. 
3 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cit., 2, pp. 28-30. This latter point must 
not be assimilated to that concerning the alleged normativity of meaning and intention. 
The two points are distinguished very clearly in Paul A. Boghossian, The Rule-Following 
Considerations, V, part II (Dispositions and Meaning: Normativity), in Mind, vol. 
XCVIII, 1989, pp. 507-549, as well as in Åsa Maria Wikforss, Semantic Normativity, I, § 
1, pp. 207-209, in Philosophical Studies, vol. CII, 2001, pp. 203-226. 
4 Andrea Guardo, Kripke’s Account of the Rule-Following Considerations, forthcoming 
in European Journal of Philosophy and Andrea Guardo, The Argument from Normativity 
against Dispositional Analyses of Meaning, in Volker A. Munz, Klaus Puhl, Joseph 
Wang, Language and World – Papers of the XXXII International Wittgenstein Sympo-
sium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2009. 
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approach” Kripke considers in his rejoinder to this objection5. In the first 
part of the paper I will argue that Kripke’s discussion of the Ideal-Condition 
Dispositional Analysis is wanting; in the subsequent sections, I will show 
that it doesn’t matter all that much, since a few steps into the ongoing de-
bate on the metaphysics of dispositions are sufficient to show that this ap-
proach is not very promising6. 
 
I – Rule-Following and Ideal Conditions 
 
Let us start with the Argument from Finitude and Mistake. Kripke’s point 
of departure is that something can constitute my meaning a certain thing by 
“+” only if it can determine the correctness criteria for my use of that sign7 
(for simplicity’s sake, Kripke works with a simplified notion of correctness: 
correctness as accordance with some fact in my past history8; I will do the 
same). From this it follows that in order to analyse my meaning addition by 
“+” in terms of my having certain dispositions, the dispositionalist must 
produce a suitable definition of the relevant correctness criteria in terms of 
my dispositions (it is worth stressing that this claim is weaker than that of 
                                               
5 For other proposals see, e. g., Fred I. Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1981 and Jerry A. Fodor, A Theory of Content, II: the Theory, in Jerry 
A. Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge-London, MIT Press, 1990. 
6 An anonymous referee for this journal remarked that my discussion seems mostly di-
rected at a conceptual analysis claim, rather than at some a posteriori form of reduction. 
The referee is right, and, therefore, I think I owe the reader some explanation here. Well, 
take a paradigmatic example of a posteriori reduction: that of heat to molecular motion. It 
should be clear that even if such a reduction can be seen as an explanation of the phe-
nomenon of heat, it would be a mystification to say that before the reduction we had no 
idea of what heat is. And, indeed, it seems that if we had not had the faintest idea of what 
heat is, no a posteriori reduction would have been possible (actually, the issue would not 
even have arisen). Now, I am pretty sure that many semantic dispositionalists believe the 
case of (the mental state of) meaning to be analogous to that of heat; however, I think 
they are wrong: I do not believe that we have a clear enough idea of what meaning is. The 
very fact that meaning has been identified with things as diverse as qualia and disposi-
tions is inconsistent with the idea that we have strong enough intuitions on the matter. Of 
course, we have a use for sentences of the form “X means Y by Z”, but this is fully com-
patible with the idea that the notion of meaning relevant in this paper is, say, a philoso-
phical daydream. What we need here is an Erläuterung of the concept. Hence my concep-
tual-analysis reading of semantic dispositionalism. 
7 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cit., 2, p. 10. 
8 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cit., 2, p. 8. 
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the normativity of meaning9). The following Simple Dispositional Analysis 
seems to be the most natural candidate: 
 
When I perform an application of “+”, the application is correct if and only if it is 
in accordance with my past dispositions concerning its use (in a mathematical con-
text, of course). When asked for “68 + 57”, the answer I have to give is “125” be-
cause this is the answer that, in the past, I was disposed to give when queried about 
this sum10. 
 
However, some pairs of numbers are too large for my mind to grasp; there-
fore, I may have been disposed to shrug my shoulders when asked for the 
corresponding sums. According to the analysis in question, that would then 
be the correct response; and this is absurd (note that the point is that my 
dispositions cover only a finite segment of addition, not that the totality of 
my dispositions is finite, as sometimes Kripke seems willing to maintain11). 
Moreover, some of us have dispositions to make mistakes; therefore, I may 
have been disposed to give the response “5” when asked for the sum “68 + 
57”. According to the analysis in question, that would then be the correct 
response; and this is, once again, absurd (note that there would be no point 
in objecting that some of the speakers that have dispositions to make mis-
takes also have dispositions to withdraw the wrong responses and substitute 
the right ones and that we could define the right response in terms of my 
dispositions to answer when queried plus my dispositions to retract: the un-
questioned existence of subjects not disposed to withdraw the wrong re-
sponses or disposed to withdraw the right ones would indeed be sufficient to 
disqualify this definition too12). 
This was the argument. And this is the Ideal-Condition Dispositional 
Analysis: 
 
When I perform an application of “+”, the application is correct if and only if it is 
in accordance with my past dispositions concerning its use in ideal conditions. 
                                               
9 See, e. g., Anandi Hattiangadi, Is Meaning Normative?, § 1, p. 222, in Mind & Lan-
guage, vol. XXI, 2006, pp. 220-240. 
10 See Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cit., 2, pp. 22-23 and 26. 
11 This is an answer to an objection put forward in Simon Blackburn, The Individual 
Strikes Back, § 2, pp. 289-290, in Synthese, vol. LVIII, 1984, pp. 281-301. 
12 This is an answer to an objection put forward in The Individual Strikes Back, cit., § 2, 
p. 290. 
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When asked for “68 + 57”, the answer I have to give is “125” because this is the 
answer that, in the past, I was disposed to give when queried about this sum in 
ideal conditions13. 
 
Since the ideal conditions are those in which when asked for a sum, I 
give the right response, it is clear that the Argument from Finitude and Mis-
take is of no use here. However, if all we have to say on the ideal conditions 
is that they are those in which when asked for a sum, I give the right an-
swer, then the account presupposes the very notion it should explain (that of 
right answer) and it is therefore viciously circular. But is it possible to clar-
ify what “ideal conditions” means here without reference to this notion? 
Kripke maintains that we might try, but a little experimentation will reveal 
the futility of such an effort14. 
If we cannot clarify the notion of ideal conditions without reference to 
that of right response, then the account is bound to be viciously circular. So 
far, so good: the conditional definitely holds. However, Kripke fails to 
prove its antecedent. Actually, he does not even try to. He just maintains 
that “a little experimentation” will do the job; and this, no doubt, underes-
timates the complexity of the problems involved15. 
Now, once it is recognized that Kripke’s argument against the Ideal-
Condition Dispositional Analysis is incomplete, we find ourselves with a 
certain number of options. We can try to prove Kripke’s unproved assump-
tion16, we can try to build a brand new argument against the Ideal-Condition 
Dispositional Analysis17, we can even drop the Argument from Finitude and 
Mistake and concentrate on something else18. In what follows, I will turn 
the second way. More precisely, I will argue that the dispositions with 
which the Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis identifies my meaning 
                                               
13 See Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cit., 2, p. 27. 
14 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cit., 2, pp. 30-31. 
15 See The Rule-Following Considerations, cit., V, part IV (Optimal Dispositions), § 23, 
p. 537. 
16 See, e. g., The Rule-Following Considerations, cit., V, part IV. It is worth noting that 
Boghossian works with a wider concept than that of ideal conditions. This allows him to 
apply his remarks to theories such as Dretske’s, too. 
17 See, e. g., Martin Kusch, Fodor v. Kripke: Semantic Dispositionalism, Idealization and 
Ceteris Paribus Clauses, in Analysis, vol. LXV, 2005, pp. 156-164. 
18 See, e. g., Kripke’s Account of the Rule-Following Considerations, cit., § II. 
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addition by “+” do not exist (in so doing, I will develop a suggestion by 
Paul Boghossian19). 
It is worth stressing once again that the argument I will outline is an ar-
gument against the Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis. There are other 
ways for refining the Simple Dispositional Analysis and there are ways for 
resisting the Argument from Finitude and Mistake other than refining the 
Simple Dispositional Analysis. Martin and Heil, for instance, argued that 
the limitations the Argument from Finitude and Mistake finds so meaning-
ful can be explained in terms of masks and/or finks and that this fact can be 
used to show that the argument in question is flawed20 (as we will see, this 
strategy is to the Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis as Martin’s overall 
attitude towards masks is to Hauska’s treatment of masking). Now, my ar-
gument does not presume to constitute a threat to any of these options; 
however, it is of some interest to note that Martin and Heil’s proposal has 
been criticized on a basis somewhat parallel to that on which I will criticize 
the Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis21. This seems to suggest that the 
difficulties I will call attention to cannot be bypassed easily. Furthermore, I 
think that my strategy might be useful for the assessment of other philoso-
phical arguments involving the notion of a disposition in ideal conditions 
and, hence, I believe it to be of general interest. 
We can now turn to the first step of my argument. I will start with some 
remarks on the concept of a disposition. 
 
II – The Actuality Constraint 
 
Though it turns out to be rather difficult to clarify what exactly it consists 
in, most philosophers think that there is some conceptual link that ties 
statements about dispositions to conditionals; after all, there seems to be a 
conceptual link between, say, the fragility of a Bohemian glass and the fact 
                                               
19 The Rule-Following Considerations, cit., V, part I (Dispositions and Meaning: Fini-
tude), § 19, pp. 529-530. For some more recent remarks about the Argument from Fini-
tude and Mistake see Paul A. Boghossian, Epistemic Rules, § II, pp. 495-497, in The 
Journal of Philosophy, vol. CV, 2008, pp. 472-500. 
20 John Heil, C. B. Martin, Rules and Powers, in Philosophical Perspectives, vol. XII, 
1998, pp. 283-312. 
21 See Alexander Bird, Toby Handfield, Dispositions, Rules, and Finks, in Philosophical 
Studies, vol. CXL, 2008, pp. 285-298. 
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that it would break if struck. Of course, philosophers being what they are, a 
quick survey of the relevant literature will soon reveal dissenting voices; as 
early as the fifties, for example, Stuart Hampshire hurled himself at the idea 
that descriptions of character, dispositional statements such as “Elaine is 
irascible”, involve conditionals22 (actually, Hampshire often speaks of “dis-
positions”, period, but in the sense in which he uses the word while descrip-
tions of character are statements about dispositions, descriptions of “the 
causal properties of things” are not23)24. Nevertheless, as I said before, the 
idea of a conceptual link between dispositional statements and conditionals 
continues to enjoy a good press, and several philosophers still think that 
statements about dispositions are liable to a real conditional analysis. 
According to David Lewis, «[…] statements about how a thing is dis-
posed to respond to stimuli can be analysed straightforwardly in terms of 
counterfactual conditionals»25. This might seem to be far too strong a the-
sis: an irascible man does not cease to be irascible once angry, even if a 
fragile thing does cease to be fragile once broken26. However, Lewis’ claim 
is not as strong as it might seem, since his use of the word “counterfactual” 
is (as well as his reading of counterfactual constructions) a technical one, 
and his theory allows for counterfactuals with true antecedents; that is: 
counterfactuals that are not counterfactual27. Since I will rely heavily on 
Lewis’ work in what follows, I will often use counterfactual constructions 
without implying that the relevant antecedents are false. 
Until some years ago, the following Simple Conditional Analysis seemed 
a viable option: 
 
X is disposed at time T to give response R to stimulus S if and only if if X were to 
undergo stimulus S at time T, then X would give response R28 
 
                                               
22 Stuart Hampshire, Dispositions, in Analysis, vol. XIV, 1953, pp. 5-11. 
23 Dispositions, cit., p. 7. 
24 Michael Fara, Dispositions and Habituals, in Noûs, vol. XXXIX, 2005, pp. 43-82 can 
be seen as a development of some core ideas of Hampshire’s work, even if Fara does not 
mention it. 
25 David Lewis, Finkish Dispositions, I, § 1 (The Analysis Stated), p. 143 (my italics), in 
The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XLVII, 1997, pp. 143-158. 
26 See, e. g., Rules and Powers, cit., § 2, p. 291. 
27 David Lewis, Counterfactuals (1973), Oxford, Blackwell, 2001, 1, § 1.1, p. 3. 
28 See Finkish Dispositions, cit., I, § 1, p. 143. 
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(do not mistake this Simple Conditional Analysis for the Simple Disposi-
tional Analysis: the latter is an analysis of meaning in terms of dispositions, 
the former an analysis of dispositions in terms of conditionals). Then, how-
ever, came C. B. Martin’s justly famous paper on dispositions and condi-
tionals29. Martin’s point of departure is that dispositions can be caused to 
come and go. Now, S itself may be the very thing that causes the disposi-
tion to go away. If the disposition disappears quickly enough, it will not be 
manifested. Therefore, it will be false that if X were to undergo stimulus S 
at T, then it would give response R. Nevertheless, it will still be true that X 
is disposed at T to give response R to stimulus S. Such a disposition is 
called “finkish”, and it is clear that every finkish disposition is a counter-
example to the analysis30. And just as the right side of the analysis may be 
false while its left side is true, the right side may be true while the left side 
is false. S itself may be the very thing that causes X to gain the disposition. 
If the disposition is gained quickly enough, it will also be manifested. 
Therefore, it will be true that if X were to undergo stimulus S at T, then it 
would give response R. Nevertheless, it will still be false that X is disposed 
at T to give response R to stimulus S. In such a case, we can say that the 
lack of the disposition is finkish, and it is clear that also every finkish lack 
of a disposition is a counter-example to the analysis31. 
Martin’s original examples involve a wire connected to what he calls an 
“electro-fink”, a machine that instantaneously makes a dead wire live, and 
(by operating on a reverse cycle) a live one dead, as soon as the wire is 
touched by a conductor (note that the reverse-cycle electro-fink is just an 
electrical safety switch)32. These examples presuppose that there is such a 
thing as instantaneous causation. The argument I presented is Lewis’ ver-
sion of Martin’s refutation, which does not rely on this controversial as-
sumption (it is worth noting that Lewis worked out a version of Martin’s 
refutation that does not rely on the assumption in question simply because 
he acknowledged that it is controversial, not because he deemed it wrong33). 
                                               
29 C. B. Martin, Dispositions and Conditionals, in The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 
XLIV, 1994, pp. 1-8. 
30 See Finkish Dispositions, cit., I, § 2 (How a Disposition Can Be Finkish), pp. 143-144. 
31 See Finkish Dispositions, cit., I, § 3 (How a Lack of a Disposition Can Be Finkish), p. 
144. 
32 Dispositions and Conditionals, cit., § II. 
33 Finkish Dispositions, cit., I, § 5 (Resisting the Refutation: a Dilemma about Timing?). 
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Another, and for some purposes better, source of finkish cases is Lewis’ 
meddler sorcerer, who watches and waits, resolved that if ever his beloved 
but fragile, or hated but unbreakable, glass is struck, then, quick as a flash, 
he will cast a spell that renders the glass no longer fragile, or (mutatis mu-
tandis) no longer unbreakable34. 
There is a general consensus that Martin made his case against the Sim-
ple Conditional Analysis. However, the refutation of the Simple Condi-
tional Analysis is not sufficient to show that there is no conceptual link that 
ties statements about dispositions to conditionals. One could argue that the 
link, albeit real and also important, cannot take the form of an if-and-only-if 
analysis. And, needless to say, Martin’s argument also leaves room for 
other conditional analyses of dispositions. 
Here is Lewis’ Reformed Conditional Analysis: 
 
X is disposed at time T to give response R to stimulus S if and only if for some in-
trinsic property P that X has at T and some time T* after T, if X were to undergo 
stimulus S at time T and retain P until T*, then S and X’s having P would jointly 
be an X-complete cause of X’s giving response R35. 
 
We can define the concept of an intrinsic property by saying that P is an in-
trinsic property of X if and only if X has P regardless of what is going on 
outside of itself (such a definition leaves open the possibility that P be in-
trinsic to X1 but extrinsic – that is: non-intrinsic – to X2; other definitions36 
do not; however, this need not bother us here). Perfect duplicates share all 
their intrinsic properties, and the converse also holds. A cause is X-complete 
if and only if it is «[…] complete in so far as havings of properties intrinsic 
to X are concerned […]»37. 
The analysis takes into account, first, that, intuitively, X’s having a given 
disposition at a certain time and a certain world has something to do with 
X’s having a given intrinsic property at that time and that world and, sec-
                                               
34 Finkish Dispositions, cit., I, § 6 (Resisting the Refutation: a Compound Disposition?), 
p. 147. 
35 See Finkish Dispositions, cit., II, § 4 (Towards an Analysis: End), p. 157. In what fol-
lows, my use of the term “property” will be somewhat loose: I will use it to refer both to 
universals and to the corresponding tropes. 
36 Such as that of Jennifer McKitrick, A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions, § II, p. 158, in 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXXI, 2003, pp. 155-174. 
37 Finkish Dispositions, cit., II, § 4, p. 156. 
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ond, that, just as intuitively, X’s having the property in question must be, 
together with X’s undergoing the relevant stimulus, an X-complete cause of 
X’s giving the relevant response only under the assumption that X were to 
retain this property for long enough. The second point solves the problem 
posed by finkish dispositions: since finkish dispositions disappear, together 
with their “grounding properties” (the intrinsic properties cited in the analy-
sis, which in the literature are usually called “causal bases”38), before they 
succeed in bringing about their manifestations, it is not a problem that “it 
will be false that if X were to undergo stimulus S at T, then it would give 
response R”. Likewise, the first point solves the problem posed by the fink-
ish lack of dispositions, for the finkish lack of a disposition is marked out 
by the fact that the disposition in question appears, together with its ground-
ing property, at a later time and often also at another world (in Martin’s 
examples the disposition appears at that time – since in these examples cau-
sation is instantaneous – but always at another world; it is far from being 
widely recognized that if Martin had built his examples with the disposition 
appearing at that world, they would not have been counter-examples to the 
Simple Conditional Analysis – the point also applies to Martin’s examples 
of finkish dispositions). The concept of an X-complete cause is needed in 
order to account for our intuitions about the causal role of grounding prop-
erties39. 
It is generally agreed that Lewis’ analysis fares well with finks; however, 
it is often maintained that it fares considerably less well with masks40. Con-
sider, for example, a Bohemian glass with internal packing to stabilize it 
against hard knocks (a paradigmatic case of masking). It is fragile, and still 
                                               
38 As Lewis himself stresses (Finkish Dispositions, cit., II, § 2 (Towards an Analysis: Be-
ginning), p. 152), the expression “categorical bases” may be a bit too strong. Whatever 
the terminology, the concept of causal basis is absolutely central to the Reformed Condi-
tional Analysis: «A finkish disposition is a disposition with a finkish base» (ibidem, § 1 
(Causal Bases), p. 149 – see also the remarks on the “variety of finkishness that has so far 
escaped our notice” in ibidem, pp. 150-151 and those on the “modification of the notion 
of causal basis” in Jan Hauska, In Defence of Causal Bases, § II, pp. 26-27, in Austral-
asian Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXXVI, 2008, pp. 23-43). 
39 Finkish Dispositions, cit., II, § 4, p. 156. 
40 The terminology is that of Mark Johnston, How To Speak of the Colors, § 2 (Are Color 
Concepts Primary or Secondary?), p. 233, in Philosophical Studies, vol. LXVIII, 1992, 
pp. 221-263. Instead of “mask” it is sometimes used (following Alexander Bird, Disposi-
tions and Antidotes, § 2, in The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XLVIII, 1998, pp. 227-234) 
“antidote”. 
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it would not break if struck, even under the assumption that it retains the in-
trinsic property that grounds its fragility till the end of time. A finkish dis-
position is prevented from carrying out its causal work by an intrinsic 
change of its bearer. A masked disposition fails to carry out its causal work 
because of some extrinsic interfering factor. Lewis’ analysis does a good 
job of dealing with intrinsic changes, but has problems in handling extrinsic 
factors; or so it seems (as the finkish lack of a disposition is, so to speak, 
the opposite of a finkish disposition, the opposite of a mask is a mimic41; it 
is worth noting that Lewis’ analysis has no problems with mimicking). 
Well, maybe some strengthened version of Lewis’ analysis can over-
come the problem of masking (an interesting suggestion is that of treating 
positive and negative background conditions of a disposition’s manifesta-
tion alike and adding to the antecedent of the conditional on the right-hand 
side of the analysis a ceteris paribus clause42). Or maybe not: maybe the 
problem of masking is fatal to Lewis’ analysis43. Maybe it does not matter 
all that much: be that as it may with masking, maybe there are other chal-
                                               
41 The terminology is that of How To Speak of the Colors, cit., § 2, p. 232. 
42 For a promising version of this suggestion see Jan Hauska, Dispositions Unmasked, in 
Theoria, vol. LXXV, 2009, pp. 304-335. Here Hauska maintains that, contrary appear-
ances notwithstanding, the ceteris paribus clause can be non-vacuously specified by 
means of a combination of description, exemplification and enumeration (see ibidem, § 4, 
p. 319 for a clear formulation of Hauska’s claim; see also Jan Hauska, Dispositions and 
Normal Conditions, in Philosophical Studies, vol. CXXXIX, 2008, pp. 219-232 for a 
convincing criticism of the idea that the ceteris paribus clause can be non-vacuously 
specified by means of an appeal to normal conditions). Hauska also notes that since the 
ceteris paribus clause solves the problem posed by finkish dispositions too, its addition 
allows us to drop the requirement that the grounding property be retained for long enough 
(Dispositions Unmasked, cit., § 6). The remarks of Finkish Dispositions, cit., II, § 2, pp. 
152-154 may seem in line with Hauska’s approach, as Hauska himself seems to tenta-
tively suggest in Dispositions Unmasked, cit., § 2, note 12. Implicitly, Alexander Bird, 
Nature’s Metaphysics – Laws and Properties, Oxford-New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, §§ 2.2.7-9 suggests the complete opposite (in Bird’s terminology, Hauska’s 
approach is a version of response (ii), while Bird maintains that Lewis’ remarks are a ver-
sion of response (i); truth be told, what Bird regards as the correct reading of Lewis’ re-
marks looks fairly similar to a version of response (ii)). On this issue see also Disposi-
tions and Habituals, cit., § 3, pp. 49-50 and David Manley, Ryan Wasserman, On Linking 
Dispositions and Conditionals, § 2, pp. 63-64, in Mind, vol. CXVII, 2008, pp. 59-84. 
43 See, e. g., Dispositions and Antidotes, cit., Dispositions and Habituals, cit., § 3 (which 
features a quite exhaustive discussion of the possible strategies to save Lewis’ analysis) 
and Rules and Powers, cit., § 2, p. 290. 
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lenges which Lewis’ analysis is unable to meet44. Maybe conditionals are 
ill-suited to the task of accounting for dispositions45. Maybe the point is just 
that the link dispositions-conditionals cannot take the form of an if-and-
only-if analysis46. Or maybe there actually is an if-and-only-if analysis of 
dispositions in terms of conditionals, only it has little to do with the one put 
forward by Lewis47. Here I will not take sides in this dispute. The only goal 
of my brief excursus in the metaphysics of dispositions was to call attention 
to the fact that there are some intuitions that any account of dispositions has 
to respect (in some form or another). More precisely, I wanted to highlight 
that the main reason why Lewis’ analysis fares well with finks while the 
Simple Conditional Analysis is unable to deal with them would appear to be 
that the former respects the aforementioned intuitions about grounding 
properties, while the latter does not. 
Now, among the intuitions in question, that which interests me most here 
is the one that helps us to solve the problem posed by the finkish lack of 
dispositions; namely the idea that: 
 
X’s having a given disposition at a certain time and a certain world has something 
to do with X’s having a given intrinsic property at that time and that world. 
 
In what follows, I will refer to this claim by means of the label “Actuality 
Constraint”, and I will maintain that it can be used to show that the Ideal-
Condition Dispositional Analysis of meaning does not work48. 
                                               
44 On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals, cit., §§ 3-4 lists under this heading the prob-
lem of Achilles’ heels (and reverse Achilles’ heels), that of accidental closeness, the prob-
lem of comparatives, that of explaining context sensitivity and that of absent stimulus 
conditions. 
45 See, e. g., Dispositions and Antidotes, cit. and Dispositions and Habituals, cit. 
46 See, e. g., How To Speak of the Colors, cit. and Dispositions and Conditionals, cit. 
47 See, e. g., On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals, cit., § 5. 
48 It is worth noting that my argument is fully consistent with the idea that the intuitions 
in question leave room for some exceptions. In particular, it is consistent both with the 
existence of dispositions with extrinsic causal bases and with that of baseless disposi-
tions, both of which would be counterexamples to the Actuality Constraint (it is important 
not to mistake the notion of a baseless disposition, i. e. a disposition with no causal basis, 
for that of a bare disposition, i. e. a disposition with no distinct causal basis – for this lat-
ter concept see Jennifer McKitrick, The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Disposi-
tions, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LXVI, 2003, pp. 349-369). A 
Case for Extrinsic Dispositions, cit., presents several examples of (alleged) extrinsic dis-
positions, and some of them (truth be told, the less convincing, at least in my opinion) are 
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III – Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions 
 
Let us go back to the Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis, namely: 
 
When I perform an application of “+”, the application is correct if and only if it is 
in accordance with my past dispositions concerning its use in ideal conditions. 
When asked for “68 + 57”, the answer I have to give is “125” because this is the 
answer that, in the past, I was disposed to give when queried about this sum in 
ideal conditions. 
 
As it stands, the analysis is somewhat ambiguous. The root of the ambiguity 
lies in the fact that expressions such as “my past dispositions in ideal condi-
tions” can be used to make reference to different sets of dispositions. On the 
one hand, there are the dispositions I would have had if I had been in ideal 
conditions. On the other, there are, among the dispositions I actually had, 
my past dispositions to give, if conditions had been ideal, certain responses 
to certain stimuli. The difference is, roughly, that between “If I had been in 
ideal conditions, I would have had the disposition to give response R to 
stimulus S” and “I had the disposition to give, if conditions had been ideal, 
                                                                                                                                
also examples of dispositions with (allegedly) extrinsic causal bases (note that, as Lewis 
himself stresses in Finkish Dispositions, cit., II, § 2, pp. 151-152, the Reformed Condi-
tional Analysis is consistent both with the idea that dispositions are identical with their 
causal bases and with the idea that they are not – on this issue see, e. g., Frank Jackson, 
Robert Pargetter, Elizabeth W. Prior, Three Theses about Dispositions, § II, in American 
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XIX, 1982, pp. 251-257 and How To Speak of the Colors, 
cit., § 2, p. 234 –; note also that there is a trivial sense in which all dispositions are extrin-
sic – see Finkish Dispositions, cit., I, § 6, pp. 147-148 and A Case for Extrinsic Disposi-
tions, cit., § II, pp. 158-159 –; for a useful discussion of McKitrick’s work see Nature’s 
Metaphysics, cit., § 2.2.6). As for baseless dispositions, I am inclined to accept Hauska’s 
argument to the conclusion that there are not (In Defence of Causal Bases, cit., §§ V-VI – 
the argument is an attempt to amend that of Three Theses about Dispositions, cit., § I –; 
note that Hauska maintains that, in virtue of its commitment to the causal efficacy of 
some dispositional properties, his argument relies on the idea that dispositions are, at least 
sometimes, identical with their causal bases – In Defence of Causal Bases, cit., § VII, p. 
42; for the link between the “identity thesis” and the “efficacy thesis” see, e. g., Three 
Theses about Dispositions, cit., § III and Jennifer McKitrick, Are Dispositions Causally 
Relevant?, in Synthese, vol. CXLIV, 2005, pp. 357-371). Be that as it may, my argument 
does not assume either that there are no extrinsic causal bases or that there are no baseless 
dispositions. What it does assume is that all the dispositions relevant here have intrinsic 
causal bases. 
In Philosophical Studies, vol. CLVII, 2012, pp. 195-209 
 13
response R to stimulus S”. In the latter sentence, a more detailed specifica-
tion of the stimulus could make pleonastic the reference to ideal conditions; 
in the former, it could not. The question is: which one is the intended read-
ing here? 
If the intended reading were the first one, the Ideal-Condition Disposi-
tional Analysis would claim that an application of “+” is correct if and only 
if it is in accordance with some dispositions the speaker would have had in 
ideal conditions. Since, by hypothesis, what determines the correctness cri-
teria for my future use of “+” is my meaning a certain thing by that sign, the 
Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis would come down to the thesis that 
my meaning, say, addition by “+” must be identified with some dispositions 
I would have if conditions were ideal. The idea would be that my meaning 
addition by “+” at W1, the actual world, must be identified with a set of dis-
positions I have at W2, the world where the conditions are ideal that most 
resembles the actual world (let me pretend, for the sake of simplicity, that 
there is only one such world; furthermore, it should be clear that since in the 
actual world the relevant conditions are never ideal, it is never the case that 
W1 = W2 – more on this later). Or better: the idea would be that my mean-
ing addition by “+” at W1 is no more than a set of dispositions I have at W2. 
According to this reading of the Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis, if I 
say that, in all my life, by “+”, I always meant the addition function, I just 
seem to make a statement about the actual world. In fact, I am talking about 
another, merely possible, world. Kind of sad. And quite puzzling. 
Anyway, the intended reading is clearly the second one. The idea is that 
my meaning addition by “+” must be identified with my actual dispositions 
to give, if conditions were ideal, certain responses to certain stimuli. Let us 
now consider one of these dispositions, namely my disposition to reply, if 
queried about the sum of two huge numbers N1 and N2 in ideal conditions, 
with their actual sum N3. From the discussion of the previous section we 
know that: 
 
I am disposed at time T and world W to give, if conditions were ideal, the response 
“N3” to the stimulus “N1 + N2” if and only if for some intrinsic property P that I 
have at T and W and some time T* after T, if I were to undergo, in ideal condi-
tions, the stimulus “N1 + N2” at T and W and retain P until T*, then this stimulus 
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and my having P would jointly be an X-complete cause of my giving the response 
“N3” 
 
(or something like this). And now let me ask what kind of property P is. 
Here is an excerpt from Kripke’s essay: 
 
[…] if my brain had been stuffed with sufficient extra matter to grasp large enough 
numbers, and if it were given enough capacity to perform such a large addition, and 
if my life (in a healthy state) were prolonged enough, then given an addition prob-
lem involving two large numbers, m and n, I would respond with their sum […]49. 
 
The excerpt seems to suggest that P is a state of an extra-strengthened 
brain: a brain stuffed with sufficient extra matter to grasp huge numbers and 
provided with enough capacity to perform additions involving them. Of 
course, to say that P is a brain state is a bit loose. It would definitely be 
more accurate to say that P is the property of having an extra-strengthened 
brain in a given state. Moreover, it would be better to speak of a state of 
some brain area. After all, we no doubt want to be able to say that even if 
the overall state of the speaker’s brain changed, the speaker retains P. How-
ever, for simplicity’s sake, at least for the time being, I will stick to this 
wording. 
That P is a state of an extra-strengthened brain seems the most plausible 
hypothesis; after all, what else could play the causal role P is supposed to 
play? But it should be clear that if P is really a state of an extra-
strengthened brain, then P is not a property any human being has ever actu-
ally had. But the Actuality Constraint implies that I am disposed at T and W 
to give, if conditions were ideal, the response “N3” to the stimulus “N1 + 
N2” only if I have P at T and W. In Jan Hauska’s words: 
 
[…] the possession by an object of a disposition is a matter of what properties it ac-
tually has (and not, for example, of what properties it may possibly acquire)50. 
 
From this it follows that no human being has ever actually had the disposi-
tion in question. And from this, in turn, it follows that if the Ideal-Condition 
Dispositional Analysis is right, then no human being has ever meant addi-
                                               
49 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cit., 2, p. 27. 
50 In Defence of Causal Bases, cit., § II, p. 25. 
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tion by “+”. And this sounds like a reductio ad absurdum of the Ideal-
Condition Dispositional Analysis. 
This is my argument. Its core idea is that the dispositions with which the 
Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis identifies my meaning addition by 
“+” do not exist, at least not in this world. Of course, they seem to exist. 
However, this is just a deceptive by-product of the confusion between my 
disposition to give, if conditions were ideal, the response “N3” to the stimu-
lus “N1 + N2” and the disposition to give the response “N3” to the stimulus 
“N1 + N2” I would have if I were in ideal conditions. After all, even if the 
disposition to give, if conditions were ideal, the response “N3” to the stimu-
lus “N1 + N2” is a disposition I cannot have (at least not in this world), it 
may nevertheless be true that if I were in ideal conditions I would have the 
disposition to give the response “N3” to the stimulus “N1 + N2”51. The am-
biguity of the Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis is therefore the root of 
its apparent plausibility. The confusion in question is understandable. The 
excerpt quoted above shows that Kripke, too, fell victim to it, since what he 
in fact describes in that passage is the disposition to give the right response 
to the stimulus “m + n” he would have if he were in ideal conditions. How-
ever, albeit understandable, this confusion is nonetheless harmful. 
 
IV – Is P Really a State of an Extra-Strengthened Brain? 
 
If I am right, in the excerpt I quoted, Kripke makes two mistakes. As we 
have just seen, he gives the ideal conditions the wrong role: that of favour-
ing the acquisition of a disposition, rather than its manifestation. However, 
he also describes as part of the ideal conditions something, namely my brain 
being stuffed with extra matter etc…, the description of which should in 
fact enter in the specification of P. And this suggests a possible objection to 
my argument. «Maybe – so the objection goes – this latter is not a mistake. 
Maybe you wrongly described P, which in fact is a state of your actual 
(alas!) non-extra-strengthened brain, and not of your merely possible extra-
strengthened brain. If it is so, then your “Actuality Constraint” poses no 
problem for the Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis, for the alleged 
problem was simply that P is not a property any human being has ever ac-
                                               
51 But see Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cit., 2, p. 27. 
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tually had». In a nutshell, the idea would be that, of the two analyses I list 
below, I picked the wrong one. 
 
(1) I am disposed at time T and world W to give, if conditions were ideal, the re-
sponse “N3” to the stimulus “N1 + N2” if and only if at T and W I have the intrinsic 
property P, i. e. the property of having an extra-strengthened brain whose area A is 
in state S, and for some time T* after T, if I were to undergo the stimulus “N1 + 
N2” at T and W and retain P until T* and if my life (in a healthy state) were pro-
longed enough etc…, then this stimulus and my having P would jointly be an X-
complete cause of my giving the response “N3”. 
(2) I am disposed at time T and world W to give, if conditions were ideal, the re-
sponse “N3” to the stimulus “N1 + N2” if and only if at T and W I have the intrinsic 
property P, i. e. the property of having a brain whose area A is in state S, and for 
some time T* after T, if I were to undergo the stimulus “N1 + N2” at T and W and 
retain P until T*, if my brain were extra-strengthened and if my life (in a healthy 
state) were prolonged enough etc…, then this stimulus and my having P would 
jointly be an X-complete cause of my giving the response “N3”. 
 
The first is the analysis I picked, the second is the one I should have picked 
(note that both analyses imply that in the actual world the relevant condi-
tions are never ideal). 
Let us consider an old radio, tuned to wavelength W1 but switched off. 
And now consider the disposition D, namely the disposition to receive, if 
switched on in ideal conditions, wavelength W2. The question is: has the 
radio got D? To me, the most natural thing to say is that no, it has not. Let 
us now suppose we accepted that, of the two analyses of the disposition to 
answer “N3” if asked for “N1 + N2” in ideal conditions I have just listed, the 
second one is the right one. I do not see on what basis we could discard the 
line of thought that follows: «The idea that the radio in question has not got 
D is a consequence of the idea that the relevant grounding property is the 
property of being tuned to wavelength W2. But in fact being tuned to wave-
length W2 is part of being in the ideal conditions. Hence, there is nothing in 
the situation as described that warrants the idea that the radio has not D» (it 
should be clear that this line of thought is completely analogous to the one 
behind our imaginary objection). This seems to show that if we accept the 
reading suggested by our imaginary objector, we find ourselves with coun-
terintuitive disposition ascriptions. And this seems to give us some reason 
to reject such a reading. 
In Philosophical Studies, vol. CLVII, 2012, pp. 195-209 
 17
Some may be inclined to think that the spirit of the objection can survive 
the rejection of (2). In its original formulation, the objection is an attempt to 
defend the Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis of meaning. First, it in-
sists that when asked for “N1 + N2”, the answer I have to give is “N3” be-
cause this is the answer that, in the past, I was disposed to give when que-
ried about this sum in ideal conditions. Afterwards, it stresses that the dis-
position to give, if conditions were ideal, the response “N3” to the stimulus 
“N1 + N2” must be identified with the disposition described in the right-
hand side of (2). In its revised formulation, the objection is an attempt to 
defend a weaker claim, namely the general thesis that my meaning a certain 
thing by a certain sign can be analysed in terms of my having certain dispo-
sitions. As in the original formulation, the idea is that what makes “N3” the 
right answer to “N1 + N2” is my having had the disposition described in the 
right-hand side of (2). However, while in the original formulation the idea 
stems from a twofold commitment to, on the one hand, the Ideal-Condition 
Dispositional Analysis and, on the other, the interpretative approach exem-
plified by (2), this time the idea in question is embraced, so to speak, “di-
rectly”. In other words, while in the original formulation what we had was 
the Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis plus some footnotes concerning 
the intended reading of “ideal conditions”, what we have now is just some-
thing along the lines of the following Reformed Dispositional Analysis 
(which, of course, must not be confused with Lewis’ Reformed Conditional 
Analysis): 
 
When I perform an application of “+”, the application is correct if and only if it is 
in accordance with my past dispositions concerning its use in conditions such as 
those sketched in the right-hand side of (2). When asked for “68 + 57”, the answer 
I have to give is “125” because this is the answer that, in the past, I was disposed to 
give when queried about this sum in such conditions. 
 
I do not believe that this kind of analysis can work. To see why, let us 
come back to the Simple Dispositional Analysis of meaning. According to 
this analysis, when asked for “N1 + N2”, the answer I have to give is the an-
swer that, in the past, I was disposed to give when queried about this sum. 
But N1 and N2 are huge numbers and, therefore, they are too large for my 
mind to grasp. Hence, we can no doubt suppose that the answer that, in the 
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past, I was disposed to give when queried about this sum was a shrugging 
of the shoulders. According to the analysis in question, that would then be 
the correct response; and this is absurd. The Ideal-Condition Dispositional 
Analysis’ recipe for solving the problem is to argue that, in fact, the cor-
rectness-determining disposition is another one, namely my past disposition 
to give, if conditions were ideal, the response “N3” to the stimulus “N1 + 
N2”. But what makes this disposition the correctness-determining one? 
What makes it the one that determines which response I have to give? Why 
this one and not, for instance, my disposition to shrug my shoulders? As far 
as I can see, there is only one answer available to the proponents of the 
Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis. All they can do is appeal to the in-
ternal relation that links the adjectives “ideal” and “right” (or “correct”). 
Now, I am not sure that this can work. What I am sure about is that it is 
much more than what the proponents of the Reformed Dispositional Analy-
sis can offer. They, too, must explain what makes the relevant disposition 
the one that determines which response I have to give. However, having 
given up the idea of characterizing this disposition in terms of ideal condi-
tions, they have no non-question-begging way to do it. 
But let us grant, for the sake of argument, that there is a way to make the 
Reformed Dispositional Analysis of meaning work. Or let us grant that (2) 
actually is the analysis that most accurately depicts the situation; in other 
words: let us grant that P is a state of an ordinary brain and that the refer-
ence to my brain being stuffed with extra matter etc… plays the very same 
role as that to my life being prolonged. The Actuality Constraint will be no 
problem. But what about the other intuitions that the comparison between 
the Simple and the Reformed Conditional Analysis of disposition ascrip-
tions should have taught us to respect? Well, consider the conditional part 
of the right-hand side of (2). The intuition that shapes this part of the analy-
sis is, roughly, the following one: if given enough time, P must be able to 
join forces with the stimulus, the extra-strengthening of my brain, etc… and 
bring about the response. But can a state of an ordinary brain actually join 
forces with the extra-strengthening of the brain of which it is a state? To be 
able to do that, it should be able to survive this extra-strengthening process. 
But is this possible? I think not. 
All this talking of brains stuffed with extra matter and lives whose dura-
tion is indefinitely prolonged may weaken one’s grip on reality; however, it 
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should be clear why I find implausible the idea of a state of an ordinary 
brain surviving a process such as that sketched by Kripke. Stuffing a brain 
with sufficient extra matter to grasp huge numbers and providing it with 
enough capacity to perform additions involving them is not like connecting 
a new printer to your computer. It involves a drastic reorganization of the 
brain in question. And I find it hard to believe that a state of the required 
complexity could come out of such a reorganization unscathed52. 
If I am right, then we must conclude that (2) implies that no human being 
has ever actually had the disposition to give, if conditions were ideal, the 
response “N3” to the stimulus “N1 + N2”53. And, as we have already seen, 
from this, in turn, it follows that if the Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analy-
sis were right, then no human being would have ever meant addition by 
“+”. Once again, we find ourselves with a reductio ad absurdum of the 
Ideal-Condition Dispositional Analysis. And, mutatis mutandis, the same 
holds for the Reformed Dispositional Analysis. 
                                               
52 These remarks are, of course, highly speculative. Their role is just to explain why I am 
inclined to believe that even if (2) actually were the analysis that most accurately depicts 
the situation, we nevertheless would lack the relevant dispositions. My “official position” 
on the topic is the one I argued for in the first part of this last section: (2) is not the analy-
sis that most accurately depicts the situation (mutatis mutandis for the Reformed Disposi-
tional Analysis). 
53 In fact, the previous remarks would be a refutation of the idea that the relevant causal 
basis involves only my current, non-extra-strengthened brain. I tried to keep things sim-
ple. 
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